When a group of people is found going against the law, all the members of the group are accountable. Everyone is required to rise to a mutual degree of foresight, even those who have partial skills. This subjectivity trails from the law’s purpose to safeguard people similarly from each other. If everyone is authorized to equal freedom and equal safety, then neither parties with special vulnerabilities nor defendants with incomplete skills can ask for a special pardon from others. The person with unusual weaknesses cannot enforce extra responsibilities on others since executing such duties would disturb the condition of their interaction. A person would be able to separate others more than the way that individual would bind them. This is what Ripstein means by saying, people should be careful about something and the damage it may cause.
The person who has trouble keeping the standards of the proportioned motives owes those who do not complain about taking the injury collectively. To make one person’s decent assurance at risk at the degree of another’s safety would permit that person to set the contract conditions separately. Instead, they should all be captured to a mutual average. This is what Ripstein means when he says that when one person neglects a duty or obligation means that the whole society counts in negligence.
When someone refuses to take defenses against predictable damages, the hurt complainant can say they should have thought about that before. The person whose devotion is abstracted is not different from that any other negligent person. Anyone who has refused to help others pay for the consequences to which their obligation was entitled should be punished. The person who was too tired to notice the risk or too unfamiliar should be termed a negligent person. If the implement he was using fails the neighbors, then the neighbors can rightly complain that he ought to have been more careful.
